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Military Operations, Law and Late Imperial Space:  
The Spread of Militarized Adjudication
E. John Gregory
The scholarly community has written extensively on how criminal 
cases were adjudicated during the late Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-
1912) dynasties. 1 By the mid-Qing, the system consisted of multiple levels 
of hierarchical retrial-review up to the central government and mandatory 
review and approval by the emperor of certain cases, including most cases 
involving death sentences. This routine adjudicative process was a deliberate 
and time-consuming process that was usually the norm for criminal cases that 
were adjudicated within the inner empire (neidi) during times of peace. At the 
same time, scholars have long recognized that the Qing sometimes applied 
different law to different peoples across its multi-ethnic empire. 2 What this 
scholarship on the sophistication of Qing criminal process and application of 
diverse Qing law has missed, however, is that there also existed throughout 
the Ming and Qing eras a far more simpliied form of criminal adjudication 
that was also applied largely as a function of space. This simpliied form of 
adjudication was closely, although not exclusively, associated with military 
cases and is probably best called by its most generic appellation, “militarized 
adjudication” (Ch: yi junfa congshi; Manchu: coohai fafun i gamarangge), a 
term that appears frequently in Ming-Qing archives.
During the Ming and Qing eras, the most simpliied form of militarized 
adjudication—summary execution of an alleged offender by an oficial 
operating in the ield with only post hoc notice to the imperial center and little 
to no review—was alternatively referred to in popular speech as “executing 
irst and memorializing later” (xianzhan houzou), or executing under the 
1. This system was described in detail as early as the 1960’s in Bodde and Morris 1973; 
a more recent work describing the procedural system in detail is Chang 1994.
2. Heuschert 1998: 310-24; Farquhar 1968.
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authority of the imperial sword (shangfang baojian) or battle axe (fuyue). 3 
These latter terms are almost entirely absent from the Qing oficial discourse, 
save very sporadic references in memorials, the Veritable Records, and the 
Collected Statutes, however the practice of militarized execution continued 
and actually expanded during the Qianlong era (r. 1735-96) under a new 
discourse of delegated imperial authority referred to as immediately executing 
under authority of the imperial standard (gongqing wangming jixing zhengfa).
Within the historical record, it is easy to distinguish criminal cases 
adjudicated under the routine process from those handled by way of 
militarized adjudication. As linguistic, symbolic, and practical discourse, 
militarized adjudication was composed of a recognizable analytical approach 
and included distinct symbols with meanings that varied over time. Such cases 
often cited campaign orders (junling; haoling; faling). 4 Rather than relecting 
the action of multiple hierarchical ofices and central government agencies 
involved in the routine retrial-review process, the adjudicative discourse in 
militarized adjudicationwas often limited to communications between a high-
level oficial in the ield (e.g., qinchai dachen, jinglüe, governor, governor-
general) charged with military duties and the emperor (or the imperial ofice). 
Sometimes this communication consisted of nothing more than a post hoc and 
summary notiication from the oficial that he had autonomously executed an 
offender. Whereas it was common for an early Qing routine criminal memorial 
documenting the routine process (xingke tiben) to be more than forty folds in 
length, a militarized adjudication memorial was commonly less than eight folds 
in length (sometimes just three or four folds). Towards the end of the Kangxi 
reign (r. 1662-1722), militarized adjudication matters could be entirely self-
contained within one or two palace memorials (zhupi zouzhe) whereas death 
penalty cases processed under routine adjudication still generated extensive 
xingke tiben at the central-government level.
As the name suggests, militarized adjudication was a concept associated 
with military law (junfa; M: coohai fafun). “Military Law,” already known 
in the time of the Qin and Han dynasties (206 BC-AD 220), did not develop 
as an exception to the civilian law, but in many ways preceded it. 5 The 
concept was well developed by the Ming dynasty. 6 In fact, traditional Chinese 
3. Zhang 2012: 571.
4. A number of these campaign orders can be found in the “campaign” section of the 
Collected Statutes (precedents) (1749). 
5. Zhou and Jia 1999: 38-40. See also Zhou 2008.
6. The term junfa appeared in many literary references starting around the Qin dynasty 
(221-206 BC). Sima Guang’s eleventh-century Song classic A Comprehensive Mirror 
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historiography holds that “punishment started with the military (xing shiyu 
bing).” 7 By at least the mid-Ming, the Chinese term junfa had two broad 
meanings. First, it referred to militarized adjudication, a particular mode of 
trying cases; second, it referred to the entire body of laws that represented 
the proper legal-norms of military behavior, what one might cautiously call a 
form of substantive law. This military law included a vast array of rules and 
laws from temporary campaign orders (junling) to administrative provisions 
(such as those contained in the late seventeenth and eighteenth-century Central 
Military Administrative Reference (Zhongshu zhengkao) and later in the early 
nineteenth-century Administrative Sanctions of the Board of Punishments 
(Bingbu chufen zeli). 8 The Military Law (Binglü) section of the Ming-Qing 
Codes (the Daqing luli and its predecessor codes) also set forth military law. 
Militarized adjudication, however, and (substantive) military law were not 
always co-extent.
By the time of the Ming, when a soldier or military-related oficial violated 
military law, it did not necessarily follow that he would be tried under the 
simpliied procedures of militarized adjudication. In fact, most of the 
crimes deined under the Military Law section of the Code were structurally 
indistinguishable from other crimes in the Ming-Qing criminal Codes and, 
despite the fact that these crimes were “military crimes,” they were generally 
intended to be adjudicated under the drawn-out retrial-review process, 
similar to non-military crimes deined in the Code. Even when institutional-
military cases were tried under special military-related ofices and oficials, 
at least during peacetime, the overall process (trial, retrial, and approval by 
the emperor, if applicable) was generally similar to non-military cases. 9 This 
raises the question, under what circumstances were military cases tried by 
way of militarized adjudication? In this essay, I demonstrate that thinking 
of these cases spatially—thinking of the method of adjudication loosely as a 
function of where the underlying crime occurred and/or where the suspect was 
located at the time of trial—helps us understand why some military cases were 
tried under militarized adjudication and some were not. This, in turn helps us 
understand why the frontier increasingly came to be seen as a zone of legal 
signiicance during the Qing. Finally, it helps us understand why militarized 
adjudication expanded signiicantly with the signiicant increase in military 
for Government (Zizhi tongjian) contained many references to junfa from previous 
dynasties, relecting both militarized adjudication and other meanings.
7. Zhu 2010: 67-81; Zeng 2011: 40-42.
8. Zhongshu zhengkao (1742).
9. Zhou 2008: 304.
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activity associated with the Qianlong emperor’s (r. 1735-96) vast expansion of 
imperial space.
Spatial Inluence on the Development of Militarized Adjudication
The Seven Military Classics, originating mostly during the Warring States 
period (403-221 BC), early on recognized that rules of military discipline had 
to be clear, and punishment had to be quick in order to maintain the authority 
of the commander and unit discipline during battle. 10 They already contained 
the basic ideas of awards and punishments (shangfa) and emphasized that 
expeditiousness and lack of leniency were critical to military discipline. By 
the mid-Ming, the association between militarized adjudication and battleield 
operations was well-recognized. For instance, Neo-Confucian philosopher and 
ifteenth-century Board of War minister Wang Yangming (1472-1529) authored 
a number of memorials while a secretary on the Nanjing Board of War, several 
of which addressed militarized adjudication, including the following from 
1499 discussing actions at the epicenter of military operations:
From now on, for any oficer leading soldiers in combat, if soldiers under his 
command retreat or fail to follow orders, permission is granted to adjudicate the 
matter in front of the troops according to militarized adjudication (yi junfa congshi). 
If the leader himself does not follow orders, then the commander-general (zongtong 
guan) is granted permission to adjudicate the leader’s case according to militarized 
adjudication in front of the troops. 11
Reafirming the link between actual battleield operations and militarized 
adjudication, in his New Book on Military Discipline (Jixian xinshu), Qi 
Jiguang (1528-88) described a number of orders listing offenses that were 
10. The Seven Military Classics, consisted of works written between the Warring States 
period and the Song, and were compiled as a cannon during the Song. With some 
exceptions, they served as a basis for the imperial military examinations during the 
Qing period. They consisted of: Tai Gong’s Six Secret Teaching, Sima Fa, Sunzi’s Art 
of War, Wuzi, Wei Liaozi, The Three Strategies of Huangshi Gong, and Questions and 
Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Wei Gong. Sawyer 1993.
11. In July 1517, the Board of War had been requested to grant militarized adjudication 
authority to the provincial military commander whereas in that particular theater of 
operations, it had only previously been granted to the grand coordinator. Wang 2011: 
32: 39v.
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to be adjudicated according to militarized adjudication while on campaign. 12 
Notably, battleield retreat was the only offense listed which included 
completely autonomous authority to carry out the death penalty. 13 In this regard, 
Qi Jiguang’s work merely relected long-standing Ming reality that treated 
leeing the battleield as requiring militarized adjudication and permitting 
full autonomy in carrying out the sentence. 14 Conceptually, this relects 
that militarized adjudication was conceptually situated squarely within the 
Chinese tradition of granting autonomy to the campaign commander, referred 
to as “convenience of action (bianyi xingshi),” because it enabled campaign 
commanders to autonomously adjudicate cases with minimum recourse to the 
administrative hierarchy. 15
Since military campaigns often took place on the far frontier, sending a 
case back to the capital for review by the emperor after multiple levels of 
review detracted from the required eficiency in administering punishment 
and detracted from military discipline. In fact, one of the earliest (and only) 
examples of a military law explicitly calling for militarized adjudication in 
the Ming-Qing Codes involved military crimes on the frontier. That statute 
was entitled “execution of military rebels” (chujue panjun). 16 For this type of 
military rebellion on the frontier—note both the military subject matter and the 
association with the frontier—the Ming-Qing Codes permitted local oficials 
to execute an accused following only review by the governor (xunfu) and/or 
governor-general (zongdu), two oficials located at the provincial level, rather 
than go through the routine process of extended retrial-review and approval by 
12. Not maintaining proper order in the ranks during march, leaving the unit without 
authorization, not obeying the signal drums and signal lags, not abiding or properly 
transmitting orders, getting lost on the road, and rioting were all to be adjudicated 
under militarized adjudication (ju zhi junfa).
13. This provision included the provisions for group punishment, going all the way up 
the chain of command, making both community heads (jiazhang) responsible as well 
as ten-men unit leaders (duizhang). If they retreated with their soldiers they were 
executed. Qi 2012 [1560]: 41-5.
14. The Collected Statutes of the Ming (Daming Huidian) already included an order from 
1449 requiring that if the leader (toumu) was the irst to retreat in cowardice, then the 
justice oficial was to decapitate him and choose another leader to replace him. If the 
soldiers regardless of the leader, retreated “irst in cowardice on their own,” then the 
soldiers in the ranks behind them were permitted to kill them, and they were to be 
rewarded for this action. MHD, 111: 6r; QHDSL, 111: 14v-15v.
15. Zhao 2012: 160-61.




the emperor. 17 Further, if the plotting occurred during battle, then local oficials 
could execute the accused on the spot without even seeking approval from 
the governor/governor-general. In both cases, the emperor had to be notiied 
immediately after the fact. 18
While frontier military rebellion statutorily called for militarized 
adjudication, most instances of militarized adjudication were the result of one 
time grants of authority based on speciic situations. For instance, in an August 
7, 1640 (CZ 13/6/20) draft memorial, the Ming Board of War responded to 
an edict from the Chongzhen emperor seeking recommendations following 
a disastrous Manchu raid the year prior. The Board styled their memorial a 
“recommendation that junfa be made manifest (shenming junfa).” But what 
exactly did the memorialist mean by junfa? We know because he provided a 
historical example of how such an approach could address discipline problems, 
noting that in the time of the Ming founder, if soldiers were deployed to 
battle, yet were incompetent and returned from battle, they were immediately 
beheaded; likewise, if they stole anything that belonged to the people, they were 
beheaded. From this, we can surmise that the memorialist was requesting the 
emperor to authorize oficials to carry out highly autonomous death sentences 
in order to maintain military discipline. At the very end of the memorial, 
using the same language as in the initial styling of the memorial (shenming 
junfa), the original drafter requested the emperor to order all governors-
general, governors, regional commanders (zongbing), and circuit intendants 
to make junfa manifest. At some point in the drafting process, the author or 
another oficial crossed out that line, and inserted an interlinear correction, 
requesting “special promulgation of rules to make the criminal process faster 
and simpler” (teban suxing jieqiu zhi fa). This phrasing really captures the 
sense of a military process of adjudication; it is not just the substantive law 
itself, but the manner in which a case was to be adjudicated under the law. 19 
This memorial also relects the sense of militarized adjudication as something 
contingent and available only under unique circumstances and authorized to 
certain oficials.
17. Although the terms xunfu and zongdu were used during both the Ming and Qing Codes, 
the xunfu and zongdu positions evolved over time. I translate the terms throughout this 
essay respectively as governor and governor-general for consistency, but agree with 
Guy Kent that these terms are probably not the best appellation for the positions during 
the Ming period. Guy 2010.
18. Art. 33. Jones 1994: 67.
19. NGDK, 035347 (CZ 13/6/20). 
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By the period of the Ming-Qing transition, militarized adjudication had 
developed certain relatively ixed characteristics. While both the routine criminal 
track and militarized adjudication were individual criminal approaches—they 
saw individual norm-violating behavior as criminal (zui)—the distinction 
between the two manners of adjudication went beyond the Chinese tradition 
of “adjusting the harshness of criminal penalties based on the necessities of 
the times” (shiqing shizhong). The two were distinct modes of adjudication, 
both constructing the criminal activity in different ways and relecting distinct 
criminological viewpoints. 20 In a general sense, while the routine adjudicative 
process supported the maintenance of the current political order through the 
proper performance of judicial procedure and placed a heavy emphasis on 
providing an offender the opportunity to “renew himself” (zixin), militarized 
adjudication focused on deterrence, expeditiousness and convenience directed 
towards maintaining “military discipline” (junji). One of the most signiicant 
differences between the two was that militarized adjudication demonstrated 
none of the structural tendencies towards leniency so obviously present in the 
routine process, thus lacking were the many opportunities for review in the 
routine process that often resulted in reduction of sentence or pardon. Due 
to the close tie between imperial power and reservation of death-penalty 
approval to the emperor himself, it is not surprising that the greatest extent 
of autonomous jurisdiction under militarized adjudication was also the rarest: 
complete autonomy to investigate, try, and carry out death sentences with 
no retrial-review and only post hoc notiication to the emperor. Restrictive 
grants—far more common—dispensed with various levels of retrial-review 
but, consistent with the emperor’s position at the apex of the criminal-judicial 
hierarchy, still required inal imperial permission prior to carrying out a death 
sentence.
A 1637 draft memorial from the Ming Board of War demonstrated three 
things: irst, the conceptual link between military discipline and militarized 
adjudication was deterrence; second, that militarized adjudication was about 
expedited procedures and judicial autonomy at a level below the emperor; 
and third, that such authority was always contingent and normally a function 
of proximity to battle or physical space associated with military activity. In 
the 1630’s, one important epicenter of military operations was the northeast 
in today’s Liaoning and Jilin provinces. By January 1637 (CZ 9/12), with 
increasing Manchu raids, the Ming Board of War, in conjunction with various 
governors-general, memorialized the emperor requesting that militarized 
adjudication authority be granted to the provincial military commissioners 
20. Long 2014: 291-92.
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(dufu) extending authority to execute all oficials who dithered, retreated or 
withdrew in the face of barbarian incursions. In response, the Chongzhen 
emperor (r. 1627-1644) issued an edict authorizing limited militarized 
adjudication authority to the governors-general and governors of the nine 
frontiers. His response evinced an awareness of the distinction between 
militarized adjudication and routine criminal approaches: “for those who 
should be impeached and then punished, immediately memorialize with an 
impeachment; for those who should be immediately executed, immediately 
execute them.” 21 The fact that the governors-general had to specially request 
militarized adjudication authority as late as 1637 for operations essentially at 
the epicenter at a life-and-death moment for the dynasty, and that the emperor 
still limited jurisdiction to cases of accused oficials under the rank of colonel 
provides some idea of the irregular status of militarized adjudication.
From these sources, we get an idea of the relationship between spatial 
conditions and militarized adjudication. Across the late Ming and post-conquest, 
early Qing, whether a given military case was adjudicated under the routine 
process or under militarized adjudication corresponded closely with where the 
case occurred along what I call the “gradient of military operations.” 22 One 
can think of the epicenter of such a gradient as a particular battleield (a spatial 
element) at the time of battle (a temporal element). These two elements were 
themselves both functions of the intensity of military operations at a given 
place. Expanding out from this epicenter, multiple and irregularly-shaped zones 
corresponded with a decreasing intensity of military operations. The innermost 
zone—where the immediacy of operations made discipline a more poignant 
concern—was the point at which militarized adjudication was most often 
invoked. Because the power to approve death sentences was a fundamental 
prerogative of the emperor’s authority, wholly autonomous authority to try and 
summarily-execute offenders—the fullest extent of militarized adjudication 
authority—was seldom granted even on campaign except for conduct that 
occurred at the very epicenter of the gradient.
21. Whenever the rebel Barbarians (zeiyi) breach the frontiers (rukou), governors-general 
are hereby authorized to “immediately exercise militarized adjudication” (lizheng 
junfa) to adjudicate cases of oficials [in charge of the breached security points] who 
demonstrated “cowardice” (qie). This authority does not extent to cases of zongbing, 
circuit intendants (dao), and colonels (fujiang) who must still be impeached and 
investigated. NGDK, 201343-001 (1/17/1637). For a discussion of the Ming Nine 
Frontiers System, see Zhao 2012.
22. This concept is more fully developed in my recently-completed dissertation upon 
which this essay is based (Gregory 2015).
Military Operations, Law and Late Imperial Space
67
The outermost zone was an area of either no active military operations or 
rear-area logistical operations (e.g., the inner empire during times of peace) 
in which the routine adjudicative process was usually dominant, but not 
necessarily exclusive. Between the outer zones and the battleield-epicenter 
were zones of logistical activity supporting battleield operations as well as 
low-intensity military operations, such as routine area defense or various 
escorting and guard missions. The “deployed camps” (junying; M: coohai 
kūwaran) that directly supported military operations were usually located in 
these inner zones. For criminal adjudication, these inner zones were a gray area 
where either the routine or adjudicative process or militarized adjudication 
might pertain.
After the Qing initially occupied Beijing, one can imagine that, with ongoing 
military operations, most of the north could be classiied as falling within the 
inner zones of the military operations gradient. 23 Under these circumstances, 
we can understand how the Qing initially used militarized adjudication to 
enforce public order. In 1644 (SZ 1), when the epicenter of military operations 
lay around Shaanxi-Shandong-Henan, Prince of the Blood Dodo (1614-1649) 
was directed to apprehend former Ming Board of War oficial Zhang Jinyan 
and punish him under militarized adjudication. 24 As the epicenter shifted south 
after the fall of Yangzhou in 1645, the imperial order went out for Han men 
to shave the front of their heads and braid their hair in the Manchu style, and 
it ostensibly subjected violators to militarized adjudication (the actual cases 
suggest execution authority was still retained by the prince-regent). 25
The locus of militarized adjudication shifted with movement of the 
military operations gradient. In 1656, the Zhejiang-Jiangnan border became a 
signiicant focus of military operations as part of a coordinated effort between 
remnants of the Southern Ming and Zheng Chenggong’s “loyalist” forces on 
Taiwan, followed by a major Zheng attack on the mainland in 1659. 26 Within 
the context of this shifting epicenter, the Shunzhi emperor issued an edict that 
any soldiers and oficials assigned to low level geographical commands would 
be immediately punished under militarized adjudication if Zheng’s ships 
made landfall along the eastern coast. 27 Here, it is clear that the emperor was 
23. Adding a layer of complexity, during the Ming-Qing transition, the Qing’s pre-conquest 
evolving military law practices were being adjusted to meet the needs of post-conquest 
governance. 
24. QSL-SZ, 11: 105b
25. QSL-SZ, 17; 150a.
26. Wakeman 1985: 1042-1049.
27. QSL-SZ, 102: 789b. 
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using the threat of militarized adjudication as a way to shape future behavior 
rather than as a tool to adjudicate behavior that had already occurred, a 
common rhetorical function of junfa. But, it was still the notion of militarized 
adjudication as expedient and lacking the possibility of leniency that rendered 
the threat poignant.
Cases from the Yongzheng era (1723-1735) also conirm the relationship 
between militarized adjudication and the military operations gradient. In a 
pronouncement relating to soldiers returning from the Zunghar campaigns in 
1733, the Yongzheng emperor articulated two different degrees of militarized 
adjudication for two different positions along the military operations gradient. 
If someone spread rumors at the military front, then he was to be immediately 
decapitated under militarized adjudication; but, if soldiers, civilians, genyi 
or traders in the course of returning from battle—moving outward along the 
gradient—“spread confusion,” then they were still to be executed, but only 
after imperial approval. 28
The Association of the Frontier with Militarized Adjudication
On January 19, 1696, in preparation for his third campaign against Zunghar 
leader Galdan, the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) issued a military order 
(junling) that articulated the physical frontier (bianjing) as the determinative 
factor in choosing between routine criminal adjudication and militarized 
adjudication. 29 By doing this, the emperor afirmed the spatial application of 
militarized adjudication:
If any soldier deserts (tao) inside the frontier (bianjing yinei), then he will be 
adjudicated according to the substatute (yi dingli zhizui). If he deserts once the 
military has passed outside the frontier (chubian er tao), the high oficial with 
jurisdiction over him will send soldiers out to vigorously apprehend him and punish 
him under militarized adjudication. If those appointed to apprehend him fail to do 
so, they will be punished harshly. 30
Four years later, on December 14, 1728 (YZ 6/11/14), during the Yongzheng 
emperor’s campaign against the Zunghars, Shaanxi Governor-General Yue 
Zhongqi memorialized requesting that a sentence of execution be drafted 
28. QSL-YZ, 130: 688b-689a.
29. QHDSL, 581: 531r-532v; QSL-KX, 169: 836a-837a.
30. QHDSL, 581: 531r-532v.
Military Operations, Law and Late Imperial Space
69
[presumably by the Board of Punishments] for a rebel. Yue Zhongqi explained 
that because the rebel had been escorted to the inner empire, Yue was unable to 
simply execute him under militarized adjudication authority:
The rebel advocated for leading troops in rebellion. He is a really evil person. His 
misconduct cannot be wantonly tolerated. I have already sent him to Xi’an. The 
provincial judge already reviewed his case. Because he has already been brought 
to the interior, according to my review [of the regulations], he cannot be executed 
without going through the process of requesting an edict for decision. I do not dare 
to exercise my own convenience; therefore, I respectfully request an edict. 31
Similarly, the frontier was again cited as the line of demarcation for militarized 
adjudication in the February 26, 1732 (YZ 12/3) case of Green Standard irst-
time deserter Liu Tianqi. 32 A native of Yunnan Province, Liu had been recruited 
as a soldier (bingding), deployed to Gansu province, and assigned to Ganzhou 
as part of the forces garrisoning that prefecture. Such a garrison-defense 
assignment was situated within the inner zones, but perhaps not epicenter, of 
the military operations gradient. On October 26, 1732, he deserted the garrison 
and returned home to Yunnan. Four months later, he was apprehended in his 
native county. He was tried under the routine adjudicative process. The Board 
of Punishments cited the following rule:
If deserters [from the northwest army] are captured in Mongolia, they are to be tried 
in the deployed camp, but if captured in the interior (neidi), they are to be brought 
to Beijing and turned over to the Board of War which will then turn them over to 
the Board of Punishments. 33
Unlike the earlier Kangxi-era rule, this rule did not focus on where the 
desertion occurred, but where the deserter was apprehended. It provided 
a hard and fast rule to the campaign commander: there was no authority to 
engage in militarized adjudication in the inner empire. The emperor approved 
the sentence (which was drafted precisely according to the routine desertion 
statute set forth in the then-current version of the Qing Code). 34 The case was 
31. ZPZZ-NPM, 402000634.
32. XKTB-FHA, 02-01-02-2494-004. 
33. XKTB-FHA, 02-01-02-2494-004. 
34. By the mid-Qianlong case, this would have been a case of a summary provincial-level 
trial and execution with no imperial review. By 1774, a representative similar case—
except that it noted the execution of not one but seven campaign deserters—entailed 
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documented in a full-blown criminal memorial despite that it was a military 
desertion case.
On March 22, 1735 (YZ 13/2/28), the Yongzheng emperor again authorized 
execution pursuant to militarized adjudication for soldiers and servants (genyi) 
stationed in the outer frontier (guanbing zhuzha waibian) who stole horses 
from Mongols. According to the edict to the Board of War:
The original justiication for stationing oficial soldiers in the outer frontier was 
to defend the Mongols. If [soldiers stationed on the frontier] steal the Mongols’ 
horses, that is turning defense into harassment. It should be punished more harshly 
in order to create a better deterrent. From now on, when oficial soldiers and their 
genyi as well as others steal Mongols’ horses, they should be immediately tried to 
ensure matters are certain and then immediately executed on the spot. Have the 
appropriate high oficials make this edict known widely. If Mongols steal the horses 
of oficial soldiers, or oficial soldiers steal one another’s horses, then the cases 
shall be decided according to the old substatute.  35
These cases all suggest to some degree the use of a frontier as a trigger for 
determining whether militarized adjudication should apply in a given case. 
They go further than the earlier cases that were directly associated with military 
activity and show that the physical frontier itself, likely because of its broad 
association with potential military activity and security from outside invasion, 
could and did serve the legal function of distinguishing modes of adjudication.
Expanding Imperial Space, the Imperial Standard,  
and the Imperial Will
Fairly rare prior to the Qianlong era, militarized adjudication expanded 
rapidly during that emperor’s reign. As Zhang Shiming has argued in greater 
detail, understanding militarized adjudication spatially makes sense because 
imperial space itself expanded rapidly through the application of military 
force during this period.  36 While the term “yi junfa congshi” does continue 
to appear in the record during this time, references to the “imperial standard” 
(literally, “standard with the king’s command,” wangming qipai; M: hesei 
no central government review, immediate execution, and was documented in a palace 
memorial (zhupi zouzhe) only seven folds in length. ZPZZ-NPM, 403027684.
35. QSL-YZ, 152: 876a-876b.
36. Zhang 2012: 571.
Military Operations, Law and Late Imperial Space
71
kiru temgetu) came to constitute a far more common marker of militarized 
adjudication during the Qianlong reign. True to its name, the Qing version of 
this standard was emblazoned with both the Chinese character “order” (ling) 
and the Manchu word “law” (fafun), suggesting the dual military-legal basis of 
militarized adjudication and relecting the emperor’s authority. 37
Imperial standard from the Qing Collected Statutes
The imperial standard is easily traceable to the Ming Dynasty and early Qing, 
although it did not become the primary discursive marker of militarized 
adjudication in the documentary record until the Qianlong reign. Wang 
Yangming referred to the standard as the military commander’s symbol of 
militarized-adjudication authority. 38 In 1647 Shaanxi governor Lei Xing noted 
that it was then currently a time of active military operations (zhengzai yongjun 
zhi ji), and that without an imperial standard, any exercise of junfa would not 
37. QHD-Illustrations (1899), 106: 38r-38v.
38. Wang 2011: 32: 40v. 
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be legitimate. ” 39 In 1724, the Yongzheng emperor noted that the standard 
was to be maintained by each governor-general, governor, provincial military 
commander, and regional commander. 40 According to the 1764 Collected 
Statutes, imperial standards were issued to all specially-appointed supreme 
commanders as well as governors, governors-general, provincial military 
commanders and regional commanders (and that if they damaged or lost them, 
they would be punished). 41 Still, prior to the Qianlong reign individual cases 
of militarized adjudication invoking the imperial standard are very rare in the 
archives. It was nowhere referenced in the Qing Code until 1789, although it 
was becoming prominent in the adjudicative discourse since at least 1761.
The increase of militarized adjudication during the Qianlong era seems 
to be related to that particular emperor’s use of military force. The Qianlong 
emperor fashioned himself the “Old Man of the Ten Great Victories (shiquan 
laoren),” many of which were actually frontier debacles, and the worst of 
which was his far off southern Burma campaign(s) (1765-1770). 42 It was during 
the Burma debacle that cases of militarized adjudication “under the imperial 
standard” became ubiquitous, especially in cases of campaign dissertation. 43 
Cases processed under militarized adjudication became so common during this 
campaign that the language used in the memorial notifying the emperor of an 
execution was standardized:
According to the substatute, when soldiers desert from a military campaign, their 
punishment will be drafted as immediately decapitated (lijue), and governors and 
governors-general will rigorously apprehend them and execute them in the same 
place. At this time, I have apprehended [name of deserter] who deserted without 
authorization from the [name of the deployed camp]. It is a grave disregard for 
the law. I have therefore obeyed precedent by invoking the imperial standard and 
appointing oficials who have executed [name of offender] at the execution grounds.
39. NGDK, 007193-001.
40. QSL-YZ, 33: 501a-501b; NGDK, 011686-001; there are additional Qing-era examples 
as well, such as NGDK, 007193-001 and QSL-QL, 83: 316a.
41. QHD (1753), 73: 6v. 
42. Waley-Cohen 2006 and 2009: 45. 
43. For instance, see ZPZZ-FHA, 04-01-26-004-066 / 04-01-26-001-1822; ZPZZ-FHA, 
04-01-01-0279-006 / 04-01-01-038-2187; ZPZZ-FHA, 04-01-12-0128-103 / 04-01-
12-022-1464; ZPZZ-FHA, 04-01-01-0323-022 / 04-01-01-043-1557; ZPZZ-FHA, 
04-01-16-0057-062 / 04-01-16-009-0161; ZPZZ-FHA, 04-01-01-0323-021 / 04-01-
01-043-1551; ZPZZ-FHA, 04-01-01-0279-009 / 04-01-01-038-2201.
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Once formulated, this language became standard in almost all desertion 
summary executions throughout the rest of the Burma campaign and the rest of 
the Qianlong reign, including in all his remaining “Great Campaigns.” 44 These 
very brief —usually no more than six or seven folds— memorials were mere 
notices to the emperor that an execution had taken place. Interestingly, the 
language of “imperial standard” began to fade (but never disappeared) from the 
historical record right about the time that the term jiudi zhengfa (another term 
for summary execution) began to increase in frequency during the Daoguang 
reign (1821-1850).
Conclusion
During times of peace, cases arising out of the institutional military and 
in the civilian context were mostly tried according to a routine process that 
involved multiple levels of hierarchical review; moreover, cases involving 
the taking of a life or death penalty cases, were, in general, supposed to 
be reviewed by the emperor. Militarized adjudication, however, relected 
simpliied procedures that sometimes did not even require pre-execution 
notice to the emperor, let alone by-case imperial authorization. Through at 
least the end of the Yongzheng era, the use of militarized adjudication closely 
corresponded with the proximity of the crime to actual military operations, 
a concept I explain using the idea of a “gradient of military of operations.” 
Over time, the frontier—which itself signiied a greater proximity to military 
operations—also came to represent a line of legal demarcation for the use 
of militarized adjudication. In some sense, the frontier itself provided an 
alternative spatial condition that could supplement or even substitute for 
kinetic military operations as a precondition of militarized adjudication, a sort 
of constructive military operation imprinted on physical space. Under certain 
circumstances and for certain types of crimes, militarized adjudication was 
appropriate on the frontier, but not in the inner empire. There was a marked 
increase in the use of militarized adjudication during the Qianlong era that 
corresponded with the more robust use of the military on the frontiers which 
in turn corresponded with the expansion of imperial space. This also relected 
a spatial application of militarized adjudication. Tracking the spread of the 
symbolic and linguistic markers of militarized adjudication, such as the sharp 
44. This language is quoted from a memorial by Liangking, ZPZZ-NPM,403024416. More 
examples from the Burma campaign include ZPZZ-NPM, 403025022, 403024924, 
025073, 025386, 025393, 025686, 026169, 026278, 201870, 026710, 10935, 027684.
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rise in occurrences of the term “execution under the imperial standard” during 
the Qianlong era, helps us to understand changes in eighteenth century law, as 
exempliied by the spread of militarized adjudication, and more generally the 
legalization of space in late imperial China.
Dating Conventions
CZ. Chongzhen period (1627-1644)
SZ. Shunzhi period (1643-1661)
KX. Kanxi period (1661-1722)
YZ. Yongzheng period (1722-1735)
QL. Qianlong period (1735-1796)
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glossary
bianjing yinei 邊境 内
bianjing 邊境
bianyi xingshi 便宜行事
Bingbu Chufen Zeli 兵部處分則例
bingding 兵丁
Bingl̈ 兵
chubian er tao 出邊而逃
chujue panjun 處決叛軍






gongqing wangming jixing zhengfa 恭請王命即行正法
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shiqing shizhong’ yanjiu ‘刑法世輕世重
shiquan laoren 十全老人
tao 逃
teban suxing jieqiu zhi fa 特頒速刑節求之法
toumu 頭目
wangming qipai 王命旗牌
xianzhan houzou 斬 奏
xing shiyu bing 刑始於兵
xingke tiben 刑科題本
xun 汛
yi dingli zhizui 依定例治罪




zhengzai yongjun zhi ji 正在用軍之際
Zhongshu zhengkao 中樞政考
zhupi zouzhe 硃批奏摺
zixin 自新
Zizhi tongjian 治通鑑
zongtong guan 總統官
zui 罪

